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SPLITSYLVANIA: STATE SECESSION AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From Is New California Unconstitutional? A Centennial Reflection, 210 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2122): 
Brace yourselves for this one, Desert Riders.  New California might not 
legitimately be a State of the Union, but a mere illegal breakaway province of the 
State of California. 
In the summer of 2021, following the California financial crisis and CalPers 
pension collapse, public employee-supporting Democrats from the California 
General Assembly absented themselves from the state, preventing a quorum so 
that legislation slashing pension payouts could not be passed.  That absence 
stretched from days into weeks, as the state government largely shut down for 
lack of funding.  Seizing on this moment, thirty-four counties from the eastern 
and rural parts of what was then California organized themselves and sent 
representatives to Fresno, where those representatives declared themselves the 
new, official California General Assembly and designated individuals of their 
choice as the new, official Governor and Attorney General. 
The new legislature and officials were quickly recognized by President Trump, 
who, citing his authority under the Insurrection Act and Article IV, Section 4 of 
the U.S. Constitution, deemed them the official government of the state, and sent 
federal troops from the 101st Airborne Division to Fresno to ensure that what he 
called “leftovers” of the “old, failed state government” were unable to “cause 
trouble.”  President Trump’s recognition was echoed in a joint resolution of the 
Republican-controlled Congress, which perhaps anticipated the addition of two 
new Republican Senators. 
Immediately thereafter, the now duly recognized California legislature in Fresno 
petitioned Congress to be allowed to split California into two states.  A narrow 
coastal strip extending from Los Angeles County in the South to Sonoma County 
in the North would remain the state of California; the rest would become the new 
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state of New California.  Congress, at the President’s recommendation, 
immediately approved this change, and the state of New California was born.  
(Acquiescence to this scheme, the prior government of California was told, was 
a prerequisite to any federal bailout, but judicial review seemed unlikely anyway, 
as the Supreme Court had already held federal recognition of state governments 
to be a political question as far back as Luther v. Borden1). 
But could they do this?  Was this change—though literally within the wording of 
the Constitution—legitimate?  Well, there is the precedent of West Virginia to 
consider. 
This “future history”—borrowing heavily in places from Vasan Kesavan and 




  But 
the larger issue of intrastate secession is a growing one, and it would be helpful to 
address it, and perhaps to relieve the pressure, before things reach a more difficult 
pass. 
In fact, intrastate secession is the true secession fever: not the perennial 
postelection calls of losing parties to secede from a nation controlled by the 
opposition, but a growing movement for secession from states, with the rural parts 
of states (sometimes geographically very large parts of states) wanting to separate 
from the population-dense urban areas that essentially control state decisionmaking.  
Feeling ignored, put-upon, and mistreated, secessionists want to take their fate into 
their own hands.  These movements are common, but not likely to succeed on their 
own, as intrastate secession is, though not entirely unknown (see, e.g., West 
Virginia), very difficult to achieve. 
But these movements do indicate a widespread sense of dissatisfaction among 
(mostly rural) populations who feel that they are governed by people in distant urban 
centers who know little, and care less, about their way of life.  Such sentiments, 
which in a way resemble those regarding Britain in the lead-up to the American 
Revolution,
4
 have probably worsened since the Supreme Court’s line of cases 
beginning with Baker v. Carr
5
 weakened rural areas’ political position in favor of 
urban areas.  This problem was, to a degree, foreseen by contemporary critics of 
those decisions.
6
   
 
 1 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 2 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. 
L. REV. 291 (2002). 
 3 While the future history is fiction, the New California movement is real.  See infra Part I. 
 4 See GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 10 (rev. ed. 
2008).  Colonists argued that members of Parliament were faraway “perfect strangers” to America, 
who were “not bound in interest, duty, or affection” to Americans.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 5 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that unlike federal government, 
state governments are constitutionally forbidden from apportioning seats on basis other than 
population); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding that state redistricting presents a 
justiciable question). 
 6 See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 156 (1964).  
Kurland characterized Warren Court jurisprudence as using equality to force uniformity.  See id.  
In the context of Reynolds v. Sims, he observed: “To a Court determined to make population the 
sole standard on the theory of majority rule, all other factors become irrelevant.”  Id. 
92 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 94:2 
In this short Essay, I will describe the problem, and suggest some ways in 
which—without overturning existing Supreme Court precedent or engaging in the 
sort of constitutional brinksmanship described above—Congress might remedy this 
dissatisfaction.  Though there is no particular reason why the number of states in the 
United States should remain fixed at fifty, I will suggest that there are, in fact, 
remedies short of secession.  The result of addressing these concerns, I hope, will be 
a less-polarized and angry national politics, and perhaps a smaller chance of serious 
turmoil. 
I.     THE PROBLEM 
Intrastate secession is not exactly new in the United States: West Virginia was 
once part of Virginia, for example,
7
 and Tennessee was once part of North Carolina, 
though that evolution was less fraught.
8
  But in recent years we have seen a number 
of states facing calls to split, from inhabitants of regions who feel effectively 
unrepresented. 
In New York State, for example, there have been repeated calls to split upstate 
New York from the New York City region.  One such proposal involves letting the 
New York City area keep the name “New York,” while the new upstate state would 
be named “New Amsterdam.”
9
  The reason?  “We’re completely overwhelmed . . . 
by the policies of New York City,” according to New York State Senator Joseph 
Robach.
10
  The idea has been circulating for over twenty-five years,
11
 but now seems 
to be gaining some degree of additional support. 
Perhaps better publicized is Silicon Valley entrepreneur Tim Draper’s plan to 
split California into six states, one of which would be, essentially, Silicon Valley’s 
own preserve.
12
  Though Draper’s plan did not make the 2016 ballot,
13
 it served as 
a useful outlet for complaints about unrepresented parts of the state.  Draper 
explained his initiative this way: 
 
 7 See generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 2. 
 8 Inhabitants of the counties west of the Appalachians attempted to secede from North 
Carolina and form their own State of Franklin, which failed, but upon ratifying the Constitution in 
1789, North Carolina ceded those territories to the federal government, which recognized the state 
of Tennessee in 1796.  TRE HARGETT, SEC’Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK 2017–2018, at 
547–51 (2017). 
 9 Justin Moore, Could New York Become Two Separated States?, WKBW (May 14, 2016), 
http://www.wkbw.com/news/new-york-could-become-two-separated-states.  
 10 Jill Terreri, Splitting New York State?, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Dec. 23, 2009) (omission in 
original), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/in-the-news/joseph-e-robach/splitting-new-york-
state (statement of Sen. Joseph Robach). 
 11 Id. (“The idea has been around the state Legislature at least since 1991.”). 
 12 Gregory Ferenstein, Tim Draper Wants to Split California into Pieces and Turn Silicon 
Valley into Its Own State, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 19, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/12/19/tim-
draper-six-californias-secede-silicon-valley-ballot-initiative/; see also Philip Bump, There’s a Plan 
to Split California into 6 States. Here’s What It Might Look Like, WASH. POST (July 15, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/07/15/theres-a-plan-to-split-california-
into-6-states-heres-what-it-might-look-like/?utm_term=.9ed7b8c22766.  
 13 Laura Mandaro, ‘Six Californias’ Fails to Make California Ballot, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 
2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/09/12/six-californias-fails-
ballot/15534081/.  
2019] S T A T E  S E C E S S I O N  A N D  W H A T  T O  D O  A B O U T  I T  93 
1.  It is about time California was properly represented with Senators in 
Washington.  Now our number of Senators per person will be about average. 
2.  Competition is good, monopolies are bad.  This initiative encourages more 
competition and less monopolistic power.  Like all competitive systems, costs 
will be lower and service will be better. 
3.  Each new state can start fresh.  From a new crowd sourced state flower to a 
more relevant constitution. 
4.  Decisions can be more relevant to the population.  The regulations in one new 
state are not appropriate for another. 
5.  Individuals can move between states more freely.14 
Some such initiative might also please the residents of inland and northern 
California, who feel that the California state government—with its heavy interests 
in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas—views them with indifference or even 
hostility.15  Writing in the Los Angeles Daily News, demographer Joel Kotkin 
compared these neglected, poverty-stricken regions of California to apartheid-era 
South Africa’s “Bantustans,” observing: 
     Fresno, Bakersfield, Ontario and San Bernardino are rapidly becoming the 
Bantustans—the impoverished areas designed for Africans under the racist South 
African regime—in California’s geographic apartheid.  Poverty rates in the 
Central Valley and Inland Empire reach over a third of the population, well above 
the share in the Bay Area.  By some estimates, rural California counties suffer 
the highest unemployment rate in the country; six of the 10 metropolitan areas in 
the country with the highest percentage of jobless are located in the central and 
eastern parts of the state.  The interior counties—from San Bernardino to 
Merced—also suffer the worst health conditions in the state. 
     This disparity has worsened in recent years . . . . 
     But state policies, notably those tied to Gov. Jerry Brown’s climate jihad, 
suggests Inland Empire economist John Husing, have placed California “at war” 
with blue-collar industries like homebuilding, energy, agriculture and 
manufacturing.  These kinds of jobs are critical for regions where almost half the 
workforce has a high school education or less. 
     . . . . 
     Weighed down by coastal-imposed regulations, the interior is losing its allure 
for relocating firms.  Many firms fleeing regulation, high taxes and housing costs 




Outweighed by the population centers on the coast, and with that dominance 
undiluted by the geographic districting banned in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. 
Sims, inhabitants of these “Bantustans” are unable to obtain relief via democratic 
politics.  Under Draper’s plan, they would enjoy self-government and would be able 
 
 14 Ferenstein, supra note 12 (quoting Tim Draper, a California entrepreneur). 
 15 Joel Kotkin, The Other California: A Flyover State Within a State, L.A. DAILY NEWS 
(Apr. 10, 2017), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20170410/the-other-california-a-flyover-
state-within-a-state-joel-kotkin. 
 16 Id. 
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to choose whether to live under the sort of arrangements that find support along the 
coast, or something different. 
Somewhat less ambitious is a plan (the basis for the future history above) to 
split the wealthy coastal regions of California from the remainder, leaving the state 
of “New California” to be made up of most of the state’s rural areas.  As CBS News 
reports:  
[U]nlike other separation movements in the past, the state of New California 
wants to do things by the book, citing Article 4, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution 
and working with the state legislature to get it done, similar to the way West 
Virginia was formed. 
     . . . . 
     The group is organized with committees and a council of county 
representatives, but say it will take 10 to 18 months before they are ready to fully 
engage with the state legislature.17 
The goal is to let the rural areas govern themselves in ways more suited to their 
needs, while the wealthy coastal regions do the same.
18
 
A similar dynamic obtains in Washington State, where some legislators are 
reviving a proposal, dating back to 1915, to separate Eastern Washington into its 
own state, provisionally named “Liberty”
 19
:  
     The political divide has only increased in recent years.  The western part of 
the state, particularly the Seattle area, has supported initiatives legalizing 
marijuana and same-sex marriage and expanding gun background checks, 
proposals opposed by the majority of Eastern Washington voters. 
     “Urbanization and rapid growth in the western portion of Washington state 
have progressively heightened this divergence of cultural and economic values 
from that of the eastern portion of the state,” the bill says. 
     The new bill is also sponsored by Reps. Matt Shea of Spokane Valley and 
David Taylor of Moxee. 
     The task force the bill seeks to create would look at the legal and political 
processes for making a boundary change, according to the bill’s text.  The task 
force would determine whether the states would be divided along existing county 
 
 17 New California Declares “Independence” From Rest of State, CBS NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-california-declares-independence-from-rest-of-
state/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab7e&linkId=47001582 [hereinafter New California Independence].  The 
New California movement has a website, featuring proposed maps, declarations, and grievances.  
New California: The 51st State, NEW CAL. STATE, https://newcaliforniastate.com (last visited Dec. 
30, 2018). 
 18 New California Independence, supra note 17. 
 19 Jim Camden, Matt Shea, Bob McCaslin Propose Creating New State Called “Liberty” in 
Eastern Washington, SPOKESMAN-REV. (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/dec/07/matt-shea-bob-mccaslin-propose-creating-new-
state-/; see also Geoff Folsom, Tri-City Legislators Want Eastern Washington to Secede from the 
State, TRI-CITY HERALD (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/latest-
news/article32213466.html.  
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lines or newly drawn lines.  It would also have to consider issues like dividing up 
the tax bases, prison beds and transportation systems.
20
 
Next door in Oregon, similar sentiments are at play.  Like Washington State, 
Oregon is divided, “geographically, culturally, and politically,” by the Cascade 
Range, with the urban, liberal, environmentally conscious western coastal region 
setting policies that find little favor across the mountains in the blue-collar eastern 
part of the state, where industries revolve around things like farming, ranching, and 
mining.
21
  That creates a sharp divide.  As one Oregon resident explained, “[r]ural 
Oregonians . . . see Portland as an alien entity.  Portland sees rural Oregonians as a 
bunch of hayseeds dragging their knuckles on the ground.”22  As others have 
observed: 
     The skepticism is based on a simple principle: democratic local control is 
better than ignorant distant bureaucracy.  Urban progressives shouldn’t have 
trouble grasping this because it cuts both ways.  Elitists in the cities are no more 
capable of competently running rural affairs than a bunch of ranchers could 
effectively micromanage urban affairs from the middle of nowhere. 
     Eastern Oregon’s resistance to environmental activists is based partly on this 
leave-me-alone libertarianism and partly on the fact that many people use the 
land to earn a living—and also, perhaps, on how the environment affects human 
beings differently on each side of the mountains.  Western Oregon’s climate is 
wet in the winter but relatively comfortable all year, even during heat waves and 
cold snaps.  The climate in Eastern Oregon is harsher.  “I grew up 18 miles 
outside of Bend in the era before cell phones,” [journalist Mark Hemingway] 
says, “and if your car breaks down on the wrong road in the wrong time of the 
year at the wrong time of night in four feet of snow, you might die.  People out 
there have more of a nineteenth-century naturalist view of nature, where you have 
to respect it and also fear and loathe it when necessary.”
23
 
Unsurprisingly, laws based on one worldview do not often sit well with people 
who entertain the other.  In Oregon, this has led to calls for Eastern Oregon to secede 
from the state, among other things.
24
  Advocates propose perhaps joining Idaho, a 




 20 Folsom, supra note 19 (quoting H.R. 1818, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015)). 
 21 Michael J. Totten, Fractured West, CITY J. (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.city-
journal.org/html/fractured-west-15611.html.  
 22 Id.  
 23 Id. (quoting journalist Mark Hemingway).  
 24 See Grant Darrow, Is It Time for Eastern Oregon to Secede From the State?, ARGUS 
OBSERVER (June 23, 2015), http://www.argusobserver.com/opinion/is-it-time-for-rural-oregon-to-
secede-from-the/article_3cd77c2e-19c8-11e5-a7bf-8b0f949373cc.html; see also Anna Griffin, 
Far-Fetched as They Might Seem, Secession Movements Are Thriving in the Pacific Northwest, 
OPB (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.opb.org/news/article/pacific-northwest-secession-state-of-
jefferson-cascadia/ (describing multiple secession movements, including one to combine a large 
portion of the Pacific Northwest, including eastern Washington and eastern Oregon, into a region 
called “Cascadia,” with state flags already selling out). 
 25 Jade McDowell, Eastern Oregon Man Calls for Secession to Idaho, IDAHO PRESS (Sept. 
26, 2015), https://www.idahopress.com/news/state/eastern-oregon-man-calls-for-secession-to-
idaho/article_a80df4b4-640a-11e5-a5f2-ab7c588ac148.html.  
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There is even talk about splitting downstate Illinois away from Chicagoland.
26
  
Once again, the downstate hinterland contains a lot of people (but, despite their much 
greater geographic extent, fewer in population than the Chicago metro area) who 
feel unrepresented, and believe that Chicago’s dominance of the state causes 
downstate tax dollars to flow toward politicians’ vote-buying efforts in Chicago. 
These secession movements are not likely to be firing on Fort Sumter, or 
whatever the modern equivalent is, anytime soon.  But we live in a time when 
centrifugal forces seem to be testing centripetal ones (note the recent efforts at 
Scottish and Catalonian independence, for example), and the presence of these 
secessionist sentiments is an indication that people in the hinterlands feel poorly 
served by majoritarian political systems.  Historically, such sentiments tend to fester 
and sometimes erupt in violence.  Is that something that can be fixed? 
I think that it can.  The straightforward—though not easy—approach would be 
to just split these states up: Washington and Oregon (and maybe New York and 
Illinois) into two states, California into two, five, or six depending on your plan.  Of 
course, under Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution, it is not as easy as that:  
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State 
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State 
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the 
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
27
 
Legislative consent, required at both the state and federal levels, is likely to be 
difficult to get, barring unusual developments like a state financial breakdown.  
California’s political leadership, for example, likely enjoys running a large and 
wealthy state.  Breaking it into several states would diminish that.28  And in the case 
of California, and particularly Illinois, federal legislators might have leverage to 
promote a breakup in exchange for federal financial bailouts, should those become 
necessary. 
At the national level, breaking up states is likely to affect the balance in the 
U.S. Senate, meaning that it will almost always be opposed by whichever party 
stands to lose from it.  A sufficient Senate majority by one party might overcome 
that problem, but it would be an enormously contentious issue.  Even legislators who 
stood to gain politically might worry about the precedent.  Would another party split 
states further to change the balance again?  The need for state legislators to approve 
another split would provide some sort of a limit, but how much? 
At any rate, it should be possible to alleviate many of these problems without 
taking such a drastic step.  In the remainder of this Essay, I will sketch out a number 
 
 26 Rich Miller, Does Rauner Want Downstate to Secede?, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (June 17, 
2016), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160618/ISSUE11/306189991/does-rauner-
want-downstate-to-secede; see also Kim Geiger et al., Rauner Rips ‘Chicago Bailout’ as Overtime 
Jockeying on Budget Begins, CHI. TRIB. (June 1, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-illinois-budget-rauner-madigan-met-0602-
20160602-story.html.  
 27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 28 On the other hand, while California currently has one Governor, one Chief Justice, one 
Attorney General, etc., a broken-up California might have six such offices, giving more politicians 
an opportunity to be big fish, at the cost of dwelling in smaller, though still sizable, ponds. 
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of proposals, some of them surprisingly simple, at both the state and federal levels, 
for addressing the underlying concerns. 
II.     SOLUTIONS 
One seemingly obvious solution—overturning the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims
29
—is unlikely to be a solution at all.  Even if 
the Court were inclined to reverse those decisions, which it shows no sign of being, 
doing so would not return things to the status quo ante.  Under the post-Baker 
districting system, it would be urban legislators wielding the most power in any 
redistricting effort.  That egg would be difficult indeed to unscramble.
30
 
Nonetheless, there are things that both Congress and the states can do.  Where 
Congress is concerned, the careful use of federal legislative powers, especially in 
sensitive areas like environmental and labor law, might restore to rural areas a 
sufficient degree of autonomy that secessionist sentiments, and general unhappiness, 
might be substantially reduced.  In short, federal law often preempts state law on 
various grounds, and I suggest local autonomy as one more. 
Federal laws regulating wages, working conditions, firearms, and 
environmental matters generally allow for states to pass more stringent laws 
governing themselves, in respect of state autonomy.  But where the population of 
states is unevenly distributed, so that inhabitants of rural regions are effectively 
unrepresented, the autonomy thus preserved is lopsided.  It is, in essence, the 
autonomy of a majority to make laws that an effectively unrepresented minority 
finds oppressive. 
The federal government’s legislative role has traditionally been the opposite: 
to use (as in the case of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) a national majority to ensure that 
local majorities cannot oppress local minorities.  I thus suggest that federal laws 
regulating these key subject-matter areas be recast to preempt more restrictive state 
laws, meaning that urban areas would be unable to impose stricter laws on less-
powerful rural areas.  If this seems too inflexible, perhaps that preemption should in 
some cases be defeasible at the county level.  If the government of a county 
affirmatively wants to accept stricter state regulations, then it may do so; but if not, 
then the federal regulations are a ceiling, as well as a floor. 
Given the expansive reach of federal legislative power today, states would have 
difficulty challenging this approach as beyond federal authority.
31
  And given the 
federal government’s traditional role, since the adoption of the Civil War 
Amendments, of protecting local minorities from oppression by local majorities, 
such an approach is not that much of a departure.  It might even find support in an 
earlier part of the Constitution, the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4, which 
 
 29 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 30 Likewise, it is possible that Congress has power to legislate geographic districting under 
its Guaranty Clause powers (I have a proof for this proposition, but it is too large to fit in the margin) 
but even so, the district-drawing would be done by the states’ current power structures.  It is not 
impossible to imagine a federal legislative solution to this, but I think it is fair to call such a solution 
vanishingly unlikely. 
 31 In some cases, the requisite preemption could probably be accomplished via administrative 
regulations. 
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provides that the United States “shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government.”
32
 
The Guaranty Clause is generally regarded (though perhaps wrongly)
33
 as 
providing no basis for judicial action, but it is listed among the powers of Congress 
as they relate to the states, and seems to grant sufficient legislative power for 
Congress to protect local interests from exploitation and domination at the hands of 
legislative representatives who do not represent them.  As mentioned earlier, such 
complaints regarding the British Parliament and its domination of the American 
colonies were a centerpiece of the American Revolution, with deep resentment 
regarding rule by faraway representatives who did not share in the circumstances or 
values of the ruled.
34
  It is difficult to imagine the Framers regarding such 
domination by distant elites as part of a legitimately Republican form of government.  
What Congress would be doing here can be seen as a form of representation-
reinforcement, using John Hart Ely’s phrase,
35
 to protect legislative minorities from 
unwarranted harm. 
Indeed, the position of rural districts in heavily urbanized states looks very 
much like another classic case of representation-reinforcement in which “more 
searching judicial inquiry” is justified where legislation targets “discrete and insular 
minorities” and where ordinary political processes seem unlikely to provide relief.
36
  
Inhabitants of rural parts of heavily urbanized states often have very different values 
and lifestyles, are generally stigmatized by the urban ruling class as “hicks” “rubes” 
and “rednecks ,” and lack comparable access not only to political power, but to 
media and other avenues that might be used to challenge the majority.  Because their 
lifestyles and economic base are sharply different from inhabitants of urban areas, 
legislation that oppresses them can be enacted with limited impact on urban 
inhabitants. 
These characteristics argue both for a congressional power to protect rural 
inhabitants against local majorities, and also for judicial evaluation, both of state 
laws and of federal remedies, conducted so as to keep this dynamic in mind.  But 
there are also things that states can do, if they wish to limit secessionist sentiment. 
There is nothing to stop a state from being mindful of the differences between 
urban and rural areas when crafting legislation or regulations.  States could adopt a 
local-option regulatory scheme relating to key subject areas on their own, and by 
doing so would lighten their footprint in rural areas and lessen the likelihood of 
festering resentments.  It is possible that urban voters would resist this, but it seems 
equally likely that they might have little enough knowledge of, or interest in, 
conditions in rural areas that no significant resistance is forthcoming. 
 
 32 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 33 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184–85 (1992) (suggesting that not all issues 
under Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964))). 
 34 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 35 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). 
 36 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
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CONCLUSION 
The rise of New California after a California state financial crisis remains 
unlikely.  But if the federal government—and perhaps that of California as well—
can maintain a degree of sensitivity, it may also be made unnecessary. 
State secession movements may never go away entirely, but relatively modest 
efforts may cause them to lose most of their salience.  In this short Essay, I have 
argued that allowing different standards for urban and rural areas in key subject-
matter areas, something that can be done by both state and federal governments 
without any constitutional changes, is likely to accomplish that goal.  I believe that 
little of value would be lost by this approach, and much, potentially, might be saved.  
 
